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PRESENTATION BY PROFESSOR WILLIAM VAN AlsTYNE' 
Dual Sovereignty, Federalism and National Criminal Law: Modernist 
Constitutional Doctrine and the Nonrole of the Supreme Court 
A. Introduction 
Near the end of the famous Watergate Hearings before Senator Sam Ervin's 
Senate Subcommittee mor~ than a decade ago, the wagging-eyebrowed Chair-
man from North Carolina summed up his conclusion following one more wit-
ness's revelation of deceit and misinformation that had characterized the 
complex events and coverup of Watergate. "Oh, what a tangled web we· 
weave, when first we practice to deceive," the Chairman opined. Senator Er-
vin's point was at once telling as well as entertaining. Watching the proceed-
ings on network television, one had the impression that the whole nation at 
once nodded along. We were all part of that memorable event. In a single, 
fondly remembered quotation, the Senator had pretty well cut through to the 
truth. 
From Watergate to this solemn panel on federalism and national criminal 
law might seem to be a very far stretch. To the contrary, I think it is not. 
There is a suitable parallel here. We, too, are now entangled in what our own 
constitutional tergiversations have wrought. There has been a consensus of 
sorts to let go of constitutional federalism, that is, of substantive federalism 
shaped by the Constitution itself. In its place, we have accepted what for want 
of a more felicitous phrase one might suitably describe as political federalism, 
or federalism to such extent as national politics solely decide. 
Under political (or political sufferance) federalism, it is for Congress to de-
cide to what extent it desires to make national law, whether civil or criminal, 
and that is that. Congress determines what in its view warrants national, uni-
form control. Insofar as national consensus (represented by Congress itself) 
decides that certain things ought to be criminalized and prosecuted, then, that 
decides the matter, and so they are made national crimes. To the extent that 
. Congress is content to leave the field to the patchwork of state criminal law, 
Congress may, on just that basis, leave matters alone. But to the extent it is 
discontent to do so, regardless of the subject, it is free to proscribe a given 
practice, acting as a national state. Only what it will suffer the states to treat 
as each might think appropriate, with no overlay of national criminal law, will 
Congress leave alone. There is nothing necessarily amiss in this arrangement. 
Indeed, an excellent case can be made, and has been, that it is just about 
• William R. and Thomas S. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
The following are the author's prepared remarks. They form a coda to two earlier articles on 
judicial abdication and federalism in the United States Supreme Court: Van Alstyne, The Second 
Death of Federalism, 83 MicH. L. REv. 1709 (1985); Federalism, Congress, the States and the 
Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769 (1987}. Reference to each 
may be helpful to fill in and supplement the brief arguments offered here. 
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right. Insofar as national consensus (represented by Congress itself) decides 
that certain things ought to be criminalized and prosecuted, whether sepa-
rately, additionally, or wholly apart from the willingness of each state to do 
so, irrespective of the subject, many will agree that the Constitution ought not 
stand in its way. 
Political sufferance federalism, as distinct from constitutional federalism, 
measures the propriety of national criminal law solely by political checks di-
rectly and indirectly operating on Congress. It does not, on the other hand, 
contemplate any significant role -for the judiciary. Rather, the judiciary is ex-
pected to defer to the outcome already reached in Congress. The judiciary 
must of course still interpret the acts Congress adopts, but it is not expected 
to do much beyond that conventional task. 1 Specifically, ··in a system of politi-
cal (or political-sufferance) federalism, it is not for the judiciary to gainsay 
such power to enact national criminal law as Congress determines to be ap-
propriate, just because Congress criminalizes something for which others are 
unable to find any implied or expressly enumerated power constitutionally 
given to Congress thus to use. 
Political federalism, as distinct from constitutional federalism, is thus suffer-
ance federalism, that is, federalism superintended by Congress and unsuperin-
tended by the courts. Essentially, two centuries after the framing and 
ratification of the Constitution, this is the system we have. To be sure, there 
was never an explicit amendment enacting political . sufferance federalism in 
lieu of constitutional federalism in the United States. Rather, the process of 
judicial appointment, acquiescence, interpretation, and deference rationaliza-
tion, has brought it effectively to pass. Nevertheless, since it has in fact come 
to pass, my comment will be quite brief. 
The following review of political sufferance federalism is divided into three 
short parts and is meant to show what has become of constitutional federalism 
with reference to national and state substantive criminal law, from the expec-
tation of 1789 to the current time. It examines three models arguably applica-
ble to the division of legislative power between Congress and the States 
according to the Constitution. It suggests that there are some constitutional 
losses, as ·well as what others regard as great national gains. There is also 
some sense of a tangled web in the manner in which the Supreme Court, as 
well as Congress, has behaved. 
B. Touching Base with the Obvious Place to Begin A Review of Federalism 
and National Substantive Criminal Law 
As we all presumably know quite well, there is no federal common law of 
crimes as such, as there is in certain states. Rather, as the Supreme Court 
I. For two strong examples of narrow statutory interpretation, each illustrating the mitigative 
possibilities of strict criminal law statutory construction, see Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 
(1957); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). 
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held early on in United States v. Hudson, 2 the Constitution vests in the na-
tional government a limited enumeration of affirmative powers pursuant to 
which Congress must act by statute insofar as one is to be held answerable to 
alleged violations of national criminal law. Under the Constitution, for the 
greater part of our history, the determination of what shall be considered 
criminally sanctionable conduct has been a primary function of state, rather 
than of national law. To state the matter somewhat differently, the plan of 
federalism is generally this: whether certain conduct shall be deemed criminal 
or not criminal is. as a general proposition, to be determined state by state. 
On the other hand, the national government must act pursuant to such 
powers as the Constitution grants it, and there is no general power in Con-
gress to say what shall be a crime.3 As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in United 
States v. Fisher.4 "[u]nder a constitution conferring specific powers, the power 
contended for must be granted, or it cannot be exercised."' Justice Brewer 
reafftrmed this principle in Kansas v. Colorado,6 where he wrote that "the 
proposition that there are legislative powers . . . not expressed in the grant of 
powers [to Congress], is in direct conflict with the doctrine that this is a gov-
ernment of enumerated powers. " 7 Hamilton specifically addressed the alloca-
tion of responsibility to the courts as well as the Congress to respect and 
apply the doctrine of enumerated powers and ·the tenth amendment when he 
wrote: 
[i]f it be said that the legislative body themselves are the constitu-
tional judges of their own powers and that the construction they 
put on them is conclusive upon the other departments it may be 
answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption where it is 
not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitu-
tion. . . . It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were 
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the 
2. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 33 (1812). In Hudson, the Court 
stated that "[t]he only question which this case presents is, whether the Circuit Courts of the 
United States can exercise a common law jurisdiction in criminal cases." ld. at 33-34. Unani-
. mously answering no, it reasoned that "[t]he powers of the general Government are made up of 
concessions from the several states-whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter ex-
pressly reserve •... The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime pursu-
ant to some power or powers expressly given it." /d. For the equivalent proposition with respect 
to national civil law, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75-79 (1938). For a review of 
the general field, see Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. 
REv. 883 (1986). 
3. For a review of Supreme Court usages of implied powers, see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
AMEluCAN CoNSTITUTION Implied Powers 962 (1986). 
~- 6 U.S. (2 Cranc:h) 358. 395 (180S). 
5. Jd. 
6. 206 u.s. 46 (1907). 
7. ld. This reflects the tenth amendment to the Constitution which states that "powers not 
delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to it by the states, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." U.S. CoNST. amend. X. 
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legislature in order, among other things, to keep the latter within 
the limits assigned to their authority.8 
1743 
The lack of federal authority to develop a federal criminal common law is 
still with us today. A useful example may illustrate this basic point, furnished 
in the state-by-state differences respecting . criminal sodomy, with respect to 
which there is, even now, no national law. In a number of states, sodomy is a 
crime as it was a crime in nearly every state as recently as 1960, but now is 
no longer. Rather, in just about half the states, consensual acts of sexual 
choice (including sodomy) have been decriminalized, as the Supreme Court 
noted in Bowers v. Hardwic~ two terms ago. 
In some states, moreover, state law has gone well beyond mere decriminali-
zation. In this latter group of states, of which California is an example, the 
civil rights law of the state may treat sodomy virtually as a protected personal 
choice; the state law may forbid discrimination against those who engage in it. 
In essence, the "law" of sodomy in the United States is not one thing but 
any one of three different things. What it is depends upon where one resides 
or where one finds oneself when one acts. While this may seem startling to 
some, it is entirely as strong, natural federalists would quite expect. 
A more interesting example of federalism and criminal law, perhaps because 
it may seem more startling, is the willful killing of another without legal privi-
lege or legal excuse, or murder. While all states, of course, disallow murder in 
some manner, it is still true that its definition, its separation by degree, the 
scope of legal privilege, the recognition of legal excuse, etc., differ in highly 
material ways, as do the penalties. In fact, at the margin, which is by no 
means trivial, what is "murder" in one state is not murder but, rather, a 
form of excusable homicide in a different state where, for example, the calcu-
lus of fault-the scope of excusing "insanity" or "diminished mental capac-
ity" -reflected in the state's law, is not the same as in the state next door. Of 
course, there is no general national crime of murder as such. Nor consistent 
with federalism, could Congress presume to enact a national general anti-hom-
icide or national general anti-sodomy criminal statute simpliciter. The reason? 
It is as obvious as it is rudimentary: the Constitution nowhere authorizes it to 
do so. 
One may wish to doubt this, perhaps especially as to homicide, about which 
one may care more than one cares about sodomy or something else. Still, 
doubt it as one will, the burden will remain exactly to show pursuant to what 
grant of power might Congress act? Other than in reference to the District of 
Columbia (a federal enclave expressly subject to plenary congressional legisla-
tive jurisdiction), or the possessions and territories of the United States, 
wherein does the Constitution confer any plenary, national, legislative jurisdic-
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 438-39 (A. Hamilton) (I. Kramnick ed. 1987); see Marbury v. 
Madison, S U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (applying The Federalist No. 78). For a review of Su-
preme Court usages of implied powers, see Implied Powers, supra note 3, at 962. 
9. 478 U.S. 196 (1986) (data respecting the pattern of state laws are presented in the Supreme 
Court's review of this case). 
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tion to say what shall generally be deemed to be a criminal offense and what 
not? So, startling or not, there is really no more to grasp onto here in regard 
to "homicide" as such than, say, "sodomy," or still something else. This, 
then, or so it seems to me, is the obvious right place to begin our brief re· 
view. Diversity and disagreement among fifty differently minded states regard· 
ing the criminality of what one does in each state is the general constitutional 
rule; superimposition of national criminality by Congress is not. 
C. Express Powers in Congress to Specify Certain Offenses And Provide for 
Their Punishment: A Strict Constructionist View 
The obligatory, albeit important, reminder of basic federalism doctrine hav-
ing just been finished, it is nonetheless true that the Constitution is not silent 
in respect to certain powers that it does take care to vest in Congress to crim-
inalize certain acts. Indeed, several specific, express clauses vest in Congress a 
power to punish certain acts or omissions as crimes against the United States. 
As to these few areas, there is no doubt Congress is empowered to act, quite 
apart from whether it tends to cross over the coverage (or non--coverage) that 
may arise as an incident of ordinary state criminal law. 
For example, there are two such explicit clauses provided in article I, section 
8, that -list certain things Congress may describe and punish as crimes. The 
first provides that "Congress shall have power ... to provide for the punish-
ment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States." 10 
Another, in the same article and the same section, provides that "Congress 
shall also have power ... to define and punish Piracies and Felonies commit· 
ted on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations." 11 Also, there 
are a few other provisions expressly providing for congressional criminal. law 
power elsewhere in the Constitution, that is, other than in article I, section 8. 
For example, article III, section 3, provides that "Congress shall have the 
Power to declare the Punishment of Treason," 12 even while limiting the defini-
tion (as well as the penalties) Congress is authorized to enact. 
Apart from these few clauses, however, the Constitution provides no other 
explicit substantive power in Congress to define what shall be criminal or to 
provide for "punishments." Accordingly, it is quite arguable (indeed, a strict 
constructionist would be encouraged so to argue) that the few clauses already 
adverted to are themselves conclusive of what Congress may do in respect to 
national substantive criminal law. In other areas of constitutional law, just to 
illustrate the potential force of this argument, the Supreme Court has given 
explicit constitutional provisions just such an exclusive effect. It has done so, 
moreover, on the seemingly logical ground of expressio unius, exclusio a/terius 
est. The expressio unius principle means that insofar as the Constitution ad-
dresses a given subject in a particular and explicit way (here, the subject of 
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. 
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
12. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
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express powers in Congress to punish certain things as crimes against the 
United States), the clauses that do so are meant to be both empowering and 
exclusive as well. And insofar as they are the latter, they are obviously not 
merely precautionary, or merely illustrative, of what Congress may do. Rather, 
they specify the sole areas in which Congress ·may make criminal-as distinct 
from civil-law. · 
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court applied this expressio unius 
approach in Marbury v. Madison. 13 There, the Court held that insofar as the 
Constitution affirmatively identified certain kinds of cases that would lie 
within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the same clause implied 
that no other kinds of cases could be brought within that jurisdiction even if 
Congress desired that they should, and even though there was no separate or 
additional express constitutional provision limiting Congress from adding to 
the original jurisdiction of the Court other kinds of cases, including other 
cases clearly within the judicial power of the United States. 14 Rather, the con-
clusion-that other kinds of cases could not be added to the Court's original 
jurisdiction-was regarded as impliedly forbidden by the specific affirmative 
provision directed to the Court's original jurisdiction as such. 
If an equivalent "strict construction" ("expressio unius") analysis were ap-
plied to our subject, it would yield a similarly strict limit on the power of 
Congress to legislate on crime: to provide such criminal sanctions. as Congress 
may decide to be appropriate in respect to each StJbject thus specified (for 
example, counterfeiting national currency, offenses on the high seas, treason) 
but not otherwise. An interesting sort of argument, is it not? 
This strict · constructionist approach would, for federalists, be much more 
conducive to federalism than what we have. For while it would not deny to 
Congress the power to be effective in respect to other enumerated powers with 
which Congress is clearly entrusted, it would limit Congress in all such in-
stances short of treating noncompliance as a crime, rather than simply as a 
civil wrong to be civilly prevented (for example, enjoined), or civilly redressed 
(for example, by money damages). In brief, it would generally disallow regula-
tion by criminalization, reserving the criminal law consequences of most trans-
actions and most personal activities in the United States as an ordinary 
incident of state law alone. 
An example, again, would be this: to "punish" the counterfeiting of na-
tional currency, national criminal statutes could obviously be enacted, because 
13. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) B7 (1803). 
14. Indeed, to the contrary, a separate clause in the same article III of the Constitution pro-
vided for the appellate jurisdiction of the Court-and then provided that appellate jurisdiction was 
subject to such exception as Congress might choose to make. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
Consistent with the empowering clause, Congress. might logically be deemed to have power to 
make an exception of certain cases otherwise reaching the Court only on appeal by providing that 
they might commence in that Court instead. The whole clause would have made eminently good 
sense, therefore, by interpreting article Ill to guarantee that certain cases could commence in the 
Supreme Court. However, unless Congress decided to so provide, all other cases within the judi-
cial power could be heard there only on appeal. The Court, however, unanimously held against 
any such claim. 
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it is explicitly provided for in article I, section 8. For acts of "robbery," 
"theft," or "embezzlement," on the other hand, whether generally or from a 
bank (and whether or not the particular bank were federally insured), any 
purely criminal prosecution that might be brought would arise solely as an 
unexceptional incident of some ordinary applicable state criminal law, insofar 
as it could arise at all. This approach-which may seem strange to some but 
perhaps ought not to seem strange to strict constructionists-would limit Con-
gress to civil (noncriminal) forms of regulation of matters in respect to which 
it is given no express power to provide for punishment in the Constitution. It 
would at the same time gain a very great deal that might be of interest to 
strong civil libertarians. It would also give much more significance than mod-
ern doctrine provides to the clause in the fifth amendment in our Bill of 
Rights which provides that no person "shall be subject for the same offence 
to be twice put in jeopardy."1' 
Defining what is the "same" offense has frequently been a problem. Where 
the United States is granted a separate sovereign substantive criminal law juris-
diction of its own (for example, to punish the counterfeiting of its currency), 
under principles of dual sovereignty it is conceded that multiple federal and 
state prosecutions are not foreclosed though the accused is twice placed in 
jeopardy on what may be a single disputed event. So, in the case just sup-
posed, there may first be a state prosecution for the state law felony of "lar- . 
ceny by trick," where the offense was the attempt by the accused to secure 
something of value from another by using counterfeit currency (the "trick" 
was the knowing use of that very currency), and then, regardless of its out-
come, a virtually identical, overlapping federal "counterfeiting" prosecution as 
well. In this instance, the same wrongdoing (passing counterfeit currency) is 
twice alleged, tried, and possibly punished, in two prosecutions, against the 
same person, in successive prosecutions. But there is no barrier to this possi-
bility despite what the fifth amendment says. Even if in the first trial an ac-
quittal was voted because the jury concluded the accused was not involved at 
all, still that acquittal, on that dispositive fact as found by the jury in favor 
of the accused, has no preclusive effect on the second jury's decision on pre-
cisely the same issue. 
It is the principle of dual sovereignty that is used to explain the permissibil-
ity of the practice of successive state and federal (national) prosecutions in 
such cases. The interest of the United States-to protect its currency from de-
basement-is independent of, and not the same as the state's interest-to pro-
tect persons from a species of criminal fraud. Thus, the one interest is not 
subsumed by the other; the interest of the United States is not redundant to 
that of the state, nor can it be treated as submerged in the determination of 
the_ state's trial jury as to what the accused did, or did not, do. The entitle-
ment of two successive criminal prosecutions, first by the federal government 
and again by the state (or first by the state and again by the United States), 
is not deemed to be foreclosed by the protection the fifth amendment pro-
IS. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
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vides. The accused can take no conclusive comfort in having been found "not 
guilty," by a jury of his or her peers, as his or her first reading of the fifth 
amendment might lead one so to suppose. He or she may at once be placed 
in jeopardy under the alternative law, by the alternative "sovereign,'' so far as 
the fifth (or the fourteenth) amendment is concerned. 16 
Under the "strict construction" view of federalism we are currently review-
ing, however,. this is not terribly distressing, or at least is not a distress that 
can often arise. The reason is that the subjects for which Congress may pro-
vide separate punishment of its own are strictly limited to those subjects with 
respect to which Congress is provided an explicit penal power, exactly as we 
have seen. 
On the other hand, note that any more generous a view of congressional 
power to impose national criminal- law necessarily also increases the field of 
"dual sovereignty" overlap between state and federal criminal law. Corre-
spondingly, the opportunities for abuse and harassment also pile up, for ex-
ample, of treating the first "sovereign's" prosecution as a dry run from which 
to learn what next time to do, contrary to the spirit of the fifth amendment 
guarantee. The strict construction view of congressional power to define and 
punish crime minimized this risk. In that respect, it is commendable addition-
ally from a fifth amendment point of view. 
In brief, while the view of substantive criminal law power in Congress we 
have been examining would doubtless handicap Congress in some measure 
from its own point of view, it would also have the following benefits: 
1. It would reflect a principle of strict construction respecting the 
Constitution generally, and also constrain Congress from legislating 
crimes short of its general tendency to deploy national criminal law; 
2. It would to the same extent re-establish the importance of each 
state's own primary responsibility for criminal law (when Congress 
may superimpose some penal rule of its own, it may hardly matter 
what a_state may or may not do); 
3. It would give real weight and more meaning to the fifth 
amendment; "autrefois acquit" and "autrefois convict" would gen-
erally be dispositive verdicts, and not merely the sound of a crimi-
nal law gong, sounding the end of "round one.'' 
4. It would not, on the other hand, significantly cut back on the 
law making power of Congress generally; the thesis is one addressed 
solely to congressional power to make national criminal law, and 
Congress might still provide civil regulation across a wider subject 
matter frontier, pursuant to such enumerated powers as it is so au-
thorized to act. 
But having now looked at this plausible model (one, incidentally, never 
adopted by the Supreme Court), let us examine a very different view. 
16. E.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). 
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D. Powers in Congress to Specify Such Crimes As It Thinks Appropriate: 
Modernist Doctrine and the Nonrole of the Supreme Court 
Despite the elegance and strong federalism (and civil liberties) appeal of this 
first view, that is, of highly limited congressional power to make a national 
criminal law, it is not the prevailing view. Rather, there is at least one major 
additional source of power pursuant to which Congress may act in presuming 
to provide penal sanctions other than the particular clauses that expressly so 
provide. Correspondingly, the field of double jeopardy prosecutions that ac-
cused persons may face parsuant to dual sovereignty entitlements of distinctive 
state and national interests is also larger. 
The additional source Congress may draw on is, simply, the "additional 
source" of any other enumerated power also granted to Congress, plus the 
necessary and proper clause in article I, section 8. In short, the power to pre-
scribe federal crimes is not limited to the short list of subjects with respect to 
which the power to "punish" is expressly vested in Congress. It extends to 
anything within any other enumerated power, though the clause enumerating 
the power relied upon by Congress may itself say nothing of a power to pun-
ish or to make something a national crime. 
By far the most familiar example of such a clause is the clause vesting in 
. Congress the power "to regulate commerce, with foreign nations, and among 
the several states, and with the Indian tribes." 17 This clause, together with the 
necessary and . proper clause, is and has been the springboard most often used 
by Congress to criminalize acts as it likes. It is also why, in the main, the 
particular subject of this panel, federalism and the limits or lack of limits on 
national criminal law, is not a very important one, as a technical matter, de-
spite many other reasons why one might be interested in the subject as a ma.t-
ter of policy, efficiency, double jeopardy, or good sense. 
The. result of the conventional wisdom-that Congress is not confined to 
providing penal sanctions only on subjects the Constitution expressly author-
izes it to treat in this way but may provide penal sanctions whenever they are 
an appropriate means of carrying any of its enumerated powers into effect-is 
that the interplay of state and federal (national) substantive criminal law is 
. principally a function of politics and policy, nothing more. Constitutionally, 
Congress need not (but it may and sometimes does) make criminals of persons 
who use the postal service to mail things: it does not matter whether what 
they send offends neither the criminal law of the state from which they make 
the mailing, nor the criminal law of the receiving state, nor, indeed, any of 
the states in between. Congress need not (but may and sometimes also does) 
similarly criminalize the use of any private commercial medium, whether be-
tween the states or wholly within a state. It does so pursuant to both the 
commerce clause and the necessary and proper clause. Even more, Congress 
may criminalize transactions without requiring evidence that the transaction, 
the participants, or, indeed, any of the items or proceeds of the transaction, 
17. U.S. CaNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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have any interstate connection, direct or indirect. Indeed, Congress has done 
so lately. In fact, on the face of the act of Congress, there may be nothing 
whatever to distinguish it from a purely ordinary state criminal law. Yet, even 
this last sort of national substantive criminal law is now deemed to be within 
Congress's power. Specifically in the last mentioned case, even as ultimately 
tested in the Supreme Court, only one JustiCe held that it was not. 18 
Moreover, because of behavior now commonplace in federalism cases in the 
Supreme Court, 19 the capacity of Congress to criminalize as it likes does not 
stop with the sort of example I -have just now recalled. What may safely now 
be bluntly claimed virtually as a national "police power" (as distinct from a 
commerce power) is not confined to commerce among the states. It is not 
confined to "commerce," as such, at all. Rather, it extends to command even 
the terms of purely local public works. If a small town undertakes to provide 
a public park entirely from local taxes, for instance, it may not now do so 
unless it can meet congressionally-dictated standards of what it must pay its 
own employees to plant the grass or supervise the playground. It must do so, 
even though what it does has nothing whatever to do with interfering with, 
much less attempting to influence, regulate, or participate in commerce among 
the states. Nor will it affect the outcome that the local park project may be in 
part a good faith community means to provide a measure of local work for 
unemployed people in the immediate community. Congress may nonetheless 
pass legislation, and has done so, to compel the community to forgo its pro-
ject entirely if it is unable or unwilling to pay such wages as Congress will 
require it to pay, without federal assistance. On what constitutional basis? 
Pursuant to what enumerated power? Pursuant to the power to "regulate ... 
the several states," that is, the clause in article I, section 8, in whose wholly 
self-determined congressional uses the Supreme Court has acquiesced. 20 
18. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 158 (1971) (act of Congress indistinguishable from 
any commonplace state extortion statute not requiring proof of any interstate element or any in-
terstate effect, .either direct or indirect, either in isolation or in combination with all identically 
treated transa<;tions, sustained). In Perez, however, Justice Stewart disagreed with the Court, stat-
ing, "I cannot escape the conclusion that this statute was beyond the power of Congress to en-
act.'' !d. at 157 (Stewart, J ., dissenting). 
19. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opinion, wrote' that: 
[i]t is illuminating for purposes of reflection, if not for argument, to note that one 
of the greatest 'fictions' of our federal system is that the Congress exercises only · 
those powers delegated to it, while the remainder are reserved to the States or to the 
people. The manner in which this Court has construed the Commerce Clause amply 
illustrates the extent of this fiction. 
!d. at 307 (emphasis added). 
20. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547 (1985) (application of 
minimum wage and overtime requirements of FLSA to local agency sustained) (overruling National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); see also Nine for the Seesaw, THE EcoNOMIST, 
Mar. 2, 1985, at 212 ("the Supreme Court seems to have declared that judicial enforcement of 
the constitutional position on federalism is at an end"). The ellipse in the text quotation of the 
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Because of the modern nonrole of the Supreme Court in leaving to Con-
gress the prerogative of determining the proper scope of its own principal 
powers as enumerated in article I and elsewhere in the Constitution, there is 
no serious restriction on what Congress may or may not choose to criminalize, 
aside from such considerations of self-restraint as Congress itself may be in-
clined, politically, to observe. To be sure, there remains the different kinds of 
limits provided by parts of the Bill of Rights, such as the first amendment's 
protection of freedom of speech. These, however, are merely the same sort of 
limits elsewhere also addressed to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment: none of these frame any federalism limits at all. The net consequence 
is, therefore, that virtually anything a state legislature might make a criminal 
offense, whether or not it has seen fit to do so, Congress may make into a 
national crime. Again, under the dual sovereignty principle of the fifth amend-
ment, the national government is entitled to bring its own prosecution, so long 
as it is nominally independent of what the state may have done, without re-
gard to the way in which the state proceeding may have concluded in respect 
to essentially the same subject and (for all practical purposes) the same crime. 
This is, in short, the federalism we now have. 
E. Sorting Out the Tangled Web of Federalism and National Criminal Law 
We have now looked briefly at two alternative views respecting the power of 
Congress to enact national criminal law. The differences between them are in-
deed extreme. The first is that which I have called conservative or strict-con-
structionist. The second is not so easily described, but modernist, or political-
sufferance federalism, will probably do. Respectively, they are very different. 
Graphically, they look like this: 
commerce clause, omitting the part of the clause, "commerce among," is deliberate and meant 
for emphasis, as a majority of the Court now treats the clause as though it lacked these limiting 
words. 
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With respect to each, one may note that they do not differ in one respect: 
there is a zone of competence in the criminal law constitutionally granted to 
Congress that the states are not constitutionally competent to deal with. 21 They 
share this narrow wedge of criminal .law jurisdiction constitutionally reserved 
to the natiQn as a whole to assert. However, in the first model the zone of 
potential national (domestic) criminal law is narrowly constrained: insofar as 
certain clauses expressly empower Congress to specify certain offenses and 
punishments, these offenses are at once both empowering and limiting, or ex-
clusive. In the second model, the authority of Congress to enact criminal laws 
is unconstrained by federalism; Congress may enact nationwide criminal law 
virtually as freely as it may in the federal conclave of the District of Colum-
bia itself. 
The second model does not yet verbally disregard the doctrine of enumer-
ated powers. Rather, it reports its nonapplication in actual practice, consistent 
with the newer nonrole of the Supreme Court. In practice, this role is that of 
interpretative acquiescence and validation of claims of congressional authority, 
an authority now subject to serious judicial (as distinct from political) check 
21. For example, defining and punishing piracy on the high seas is properly understood to be 
a power vested in the United States alone. 
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only via the Bill of Rights.22 The modernist view of legal history in the United 
States having thus been written principally since 1936, and moved on, we are 
near the end of this very brief review of federalism in the comparison of re-
spective national and state substantive criminal law. Still, before leaving the 
subject in this rather arthritic condition, a passing word or two may be appro-
priate, to venture some professional comment of my own. 
As to the first model, though I may wish to leave with this audience the 
implicit suggestion that the model does in fact reflect the correct, that is, orig-
inally established, clear constitutional division apportioning substantive criminal 
law legislative jurisdiction between Congress and the states, I actually dG not 
believe it does. Rather, despite its attractive federalist appeal and, despite even 
its "Marbury-like" (expressio unius) way of distinguishing a limited criminal 
lawmaking set of powers in Congress from a broader civil lawmaking set of 
powers in Congress, I think it is false. Rather, I do not doubt that the few 
express clauses specifically addressed to certain criminal lawmaking powers of 
Congress were precautionary, rather than exclusive. The model is elegant and 
neat (and in some ways I might wish it were correct), but it is nonetheless 
almost certainly incorrect. It would take some falsification of constitutional 
history to make it "correct," if that is so. 
Insofar as the commerce clause does and was meant to authorize Congress 
to break down barriers to trade in our national and international commerce, 
and to assure conditions of freer trade as the framers of the Constitution 
meant for Congress to do, I do not think it unconstitutional for Congress to 
provide. criminal sanctions (and not merely civil sanctions) as part of our na-
tional antitrust laws. I believe this insofar as Congress believes these sanctions 
to. be necessary and proper for their deterrent value against state or private 
efforts to interfere with trade for their own ends. This is so, by way of fur-
ther example, in respect to the enabling clauses of the three civil war amend-
ments, ·that is, the enforcement clauses provided respectively in the thirteenth, 
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. These are, after all, provisions equal in 
their own right to the enumerated powers in article I. This is so also elsewhere 
in respect to the vested powers of Congress, such as the power to impose 
certain kinds of taxes and make willful evasion or nonpayment a criminal of-
. fense. Whether one sees the power to do the latter as within the power to levy 
such taxes, or, instead, as an incident of the necessary and proper clause, it 
comes to the same point in the end. 
Having allowed this much, however, does not at all mean that one therefore 
accepts the second model: that model is also false, at least as false as the 
first, though false in a wholly different way. Its falseness lies not in its claim 
that Congress may adopt criminal law (and not merely civil law) measures ap-
propriate to the subjects actually committed to congressional determination by 
the ·constitution. Rather, it is false in the manner in which modernist doctrine 
has operate~ to efface the basic boundaries of constrained federalism in the 
22. And, albeit to a much lesser extent, to some continuing judicial willingness to enforce the 
doctrine of separated powers. 
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United States. It is that effacement of the basic boundaries that is the sham in 
our constitutional law, nothing more but also nothing less. Given that falsifi-
cation, given the Supreme Court's nonrole (or, rather, given its active role of 
passive validation of anything Congress presumes to do), we do now have a 
tangled web of exaggerated, highly overreaching, and frequently duplicative, 
national criminal law. The tangled web, itself, moreover, has two intertwined 
strands. 
The first strand in this tangled web is that which we have already at least 
twice noted, namely, that Congress is no longer obligated to act within any 
merely reasonable or any merely moderate view of its expressly enumerated 
powers. Instead, the Supreme Court has accepted so self-serving and self-ag-
grandizing a congressional view respecting the scope of enumerated power that 
none has any coherent limit worthy of discussion, much less litigation. As we 
have already noted, for example, the "power to regulate commerce among the 
states" is read as though it said the power is one "to regulate," period, 
whether or not it is commerce, whether or not it is among the states, etc. It is 
read to say that "Congress shall also have power to regulate what each state 
does though the state is not engaging in commerce but is merely attempting to 
provide local services on such terms as it believes it can afford." The falsifi-
cation of the clause is so complete that there seems little chance it can now be 
recalled. And so the same may be observed in respect to other clauses, with-
out now taking time to run the exercise through. 
There is a second strand to this tangled web, and it deserves a separate 
critical comment of its own. It is that the majority of the Court does not 
apply any serious federalism review to acts of Congress even when it is con-
fronted with a virtually transparent fraud. This may seem to be a restatement 
of the first point, but actually it is not, and I shall provide at least one case 
to try to show. 
To take up this second point specifically, suppose Congress levied a "tax" 
on all wagering transactions in the l.Jnited States. In such a case, however, 
suppose also it was quite clear that Congress would itself be disappointed were 
the "tax" actually to generate any revenue, as distinct from discouraging the 
continued occurrence of wagering. In United States v. Kahriger, 23 a Supreme 
Court majority upheld just such an act of Congress, including its enforcement 
by criminal sanctions against all those compelled to report, to disclose, and to 
pay. The majority proceeded to dispose of the case essentially by declaring 
that a tax is a tax is a tax, that is, that it does not matter why the tax. was 
enacted, or what it was meant to do. 
Surprisingly, however, Justice Frankfurter, though himself a Roosevelt ap-
pointee to the Supreme Court, strongly dissented in the case. Moreover, he 
did so on pure federalism grounds. His point was so well and so usefully 
expressed that it is well worth quoting. This is what Frankfurter had to say: 
[W]hen oblique use is made of the taxing power as to matters 
which substantively are not within the powers delegated to Con-
23. 345 u.s. 22 (1953). 
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gress, the Court cannot shut its eyes to what is obviously, because 
designedly, an attempt to control conduct which the Constitution 
left to the responsibility of the States, merely because Congress 
wrapped the legislation in the verbal cellophane of a revenue meas-
ure.24 
Justice Frankfurter!s point is crucial. Indeed, it is fundamental to any useful 
and correct model of federalism review in the Supreme Court. Disregard it, as 
the Court has and is still now inclined to do, and the distinction between the 
enumerated powers vested in Congress, and the police powers reserved to the 
states, is totally lost. 
An act though on its face nominally within an enumerated power, for ex-
ample, a national excise tax on wagering transactions, Frankfurter says, ought 
not be sustained if it is clear that it is but "an attempt to control conduct the 
Constitution left to the responsibility of the States,'' albeit an attempt 
"wrapped . . . in the verbal cellophane of a revenue measure," as this attempt 
clearly was. 25 The acceptability of gambling, Frankfurter reminds us, was not 
given to Congress to determine at all. If such wagering is not now a crime in 
a given state, Congress cannot thus subvert that policy on the one hand, by 
enacting a tax that not merely renders such wagering more expensive (as must 
happen with any tax) but, rather, is meant effectively to wipe it out. Even if 
such wagering were a crime in a given state, moreover, Congress cannot make 
it so simply because it also disapproves of gambling just as the state does, for 
its coincidence of disapproval does not enlarge its power in any way. In any 
case, the act of Congress is void because it is unauthorized by anything con-
fided to Congress in the Constitution of the United States. 
In one respect especially, the Frankfurter dissent is as important as it is 
keen. Indeed, one may say admiringly of that rare, dissenting opinion that it 
implicitly yields a thoughtful, even a brilliant, recognition and use of the fifth 
amendment, as well as of the tenth amendment and of general federalism 
principles as well. It provides one final reprise on this subject. This is the 
insight Frankfurter provides. 
The principle of dual sovereignty, pursuant to which overlapping state and 
federal prosecutions may sometimes proceed despite the fifth amendment ban 
on double jeopardy, has no standing if there is no federal interest separate 
from that which a state might hold in the event or conduct Congress's crimi-
nal statute seeks to punish. Only if Congress has a good faith interest in gen-
erating revenue, distinct from adding its own ("me too") desire to stamp out 
wagering, does the act of Congress comply with the fifth amendment's dual 
sovereignty reiteration of the federalism principles we have reviewed. In brief, 
what makes it a failure under federalism principles also makes it a sham un-
der the fifth amendment. 
If then-in Frankfurter's view-on the one hand the state in which the wa-
gering takes place finds no reason to forbid it, Congress may not attempt to 
24. !d. at 37. 
25. /d. at 38. 
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gainsay the state's choice (to permit wagering) by wrapping its (unauthorized) 
criminal law prohibition in the "verbal cellophane" of a "revenue measure." 
Yet, Congress might otherwise, of course, have imposed even a steep excise 
tax on such wagers, if it wished, incidental to raising funds to meet such ex-
penditures that Congress is constitutionally authorized to make. Equally, on 
the other hand, even if the state does crimirtalize wagering, the· duplicative act 
of Congress gains no purchase of its own merely because that is so. Indeed, 
precisely to the extent that the congressional interest is not distinguishable 
from the state's, that is, precisely to the extent it has no revenue-generating 
purpose (but purely and wholly a "police power" purpose), it fails to meet 
the separate sovereignty (that is, separate interest) premise of the fifth amend-
ment's prohibition against a person being placed twice iri jeopardy for merely 
the same offense. 
What this comes down to in the end is a moderate, third model of federal-
ism and of national criminal law. It is a view that respects the doctrine of 
enumerated powers, the tenth amendment, the principle of dual sovereignty, 
and the fifth amendment. In a word, it is the Constitution applied by consci-
entious judges. It consists, at the first step, of a fair rather than a tortured 
understanding of each power vested in Congress, an understanding commensu-
rate with conceding to Congress an ample discretion to manage the important 
responsibilities actually meant to have been committed to Congress. It consists, 
at the second step, of an equivalent sense of judicial . resolve, even as was 
admirably reflected in Frankfurter's dissent in Kahriger, 26 to be no party to 
any constitutional sham. The correct model, figuratively speaking, admitting 
one may fail to carry it more impressively than I have managed to do so in 
these few, contestable, words, looks neither like the first nor the second model 
we previously pictured. Rather, it looks or should look more like this: 
THE RANGE oF LEGISLATIVE PoWERS IN CoNGRESS 
Clauses deeined to authorize Congress to 
define crimes against the U.S. 
This is not now, however, the operative model. Rather, the modernist one 
is. The Supreme Court and Congress have, together, torn the web of constitu-
26. Id. at 37. 
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tional federalism. The moving hand of politics writes its own constitutional 
law. It makes up its own, much different sort of web. In the vision of feder-
alism that now controls the general field, as the Federalist Society should al-
ready know, the Constitution is largely not enforced. 
F. Touching Base With the Obvious Still Again, Albeit in a Different Way 
The Constitution of the United States, it is trite to say, will bear almost any 
"interpretation," given suitable will. The fact of this depressing truth27 is illus-
trated yet again in the example we have just reviewed on federalism and na-
tional criminal law. We have, for instance, looked merely at three models. 
The three models we reviewed differ significantly in their descriptions of what 
is and is not given to Congress. Yet each can be fitted to the Constitution 
without altering any words in the Constitution itself. Granting that this is so, 
however, what is it that ought to move one to adopt one rather than either of 
the other formulations as constitutionally correct? Let me try what might seem 
to be a surprisingly naive sort of answer that begins from a somewhat differ-
ent place. That is, it is an answer that actually tries not to "interpret" the 
Constitution at all. 
I think it is significant that the more naive locution of ''applying the Con-
stitution," as the way one might describe the chief task of the Supreme Court 
in constitutional law, has all but given way to the headier locution of "inter-
preting the Constitution." The two words themselves, however, are not really 
fungible in any useful sense. The two tasks they describe are not just vari-
ances on a common theme, nor is one a more sophisticated and more realistic 
restatement of the other. Rather, each of these descriptions aspires to quite a 
different thing. Indeed, they report wholly different orientations to one's 
work. Each imagines a different role for the Supreme Court of the United 
States .. 
The locution of "interpreting" the Constitution, now so commonplace in 
describing the supposed chief task of the Supreme Court, is flauntingly invita-
tionaL It frankly does suggest a different task than the task of faithfully "ap-
plying" the Constitution of the United States. Its invitation is of a sort that 
permits one to "interpret" naked emperors as actually wearing well turned out 
clothes, if one likes. It is the same usage that enables one to "interpret" a 
badger as though it were a mink (if a mink is what we need then, what the 
hell, here's one!). The privilege to interpret (as distinct from the obligation to 
apply) is papal; it vests authority to transfigure and to transform. It invites 
one, as it were, to come on board with one's own "interpretation" of some-
one else's work and, in the process, willfully displace that work along the 
way. The gloss proposed by the interpreter commands as much (it is so much 
"better" it is entitled to command). In a large way, the interpretation sup-
presses that which it purports to interpret; it becomes the interpreter's own 
27. It is a depressing truth (rather than an exhilarating truth as some believe) insofar as plia-
bility of constitutional law is the antithesis of reliability of constitutional law. 
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decal, glued over the original. The original becomes increasingly obscure. The 
decal becomes the law. When done in this way, by "interpreting," it is 
thought to be perfectly all right to prefer one's decal to the document. 
The task of "applying" is, aspirationally, an altogether different task. One 
does not aspire to interpret but, rather, to understand. One does not seek to 
do art but to act without art, to be faithful to this Constitution as best one 
knows how. Of course, it presupposes a given and one may, on that account, 
find that the .task presupposes far to much to be simply done. But, simple or 
hard, it is what one seeks to do, as distinct from "interpreting" the original 
away. The fact remains as before: what one means to do actually counts. It 
produces very different sorts of results. In the case of federalism, we have 
more or less "interpreted" the boundaries constraining "Congress away. And 
having done that, where will we turn next? 
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APPENDIX 
THREE PERSPECTIVES OF NATIONAL AND STATE CRIMINAL LAw: 
FEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
I. STRICT CONSTRUCTION 
THE RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS IN CONGRESS 
Clauses authorizing Congress to 
define crimes against the U.S. 
II. MoDERNIST DocTRINE 
THE RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS IN CONGRESS 
III. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
THE RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS IN CONGRESS 
Clauses deemed to authorize Congress to 
define crimes against the U.S. 
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1. Transjormative "Interpretations" of the Commerce Clause Accepted by 
the Supreme Court 
Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce among the sev-
eral states. 
The word "regulate" is interpreted to be inclusive of the power to prohibit. 
That is, the power to regulate is the power to prescribe the governing rule; an 
act prohibiting certain kinds of commerce is itself an example of regulating. 
So the clause is construed to say: 
Congress shall have the power to prohibit commer~~ among the sev-
eral states. 
The power to regulate commerce among the states is interpreted to include the 
power to reach those things pertinent to itself, which is bearing on commerce 
among the several states; the larger power is deemed to include a lesser one, 
to control both the thing itself and such things as may affect it in some way. 
So the clause is construed to say: 
' Congress shall have the power to regulate and prohibit whatever 
may affect commerce among the several states, though it is not 
commerce among the states. 
Since what each state may do may in some manner affect commerce among 
the several states, the clause is also construed to say: 
Congress shall have power to regulate the states, whether they are 
engaged in commerce or not. 
Thus, by the force of modernist doctrine and de facto Supreme Court abroga-
tion of judicial review, the clause now reads approximately in the following 
way: 
Congress shall have the power to regulate and prohibit what it 
deems suitable to regulate or prohibit, subject only to such limita-
tions as other provisions in this Constitution may provide. 
